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Experimental philosophers have gathered impressive evidence for the surprising 
conclusion that philosophers’ intuitions are out of step with those of the folk. As a result, 
many argue that philosophers’ intuitions are unreliable. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, a 
leading finding of experimental philosophy, we defend traditional philosophy against this 
conclusion. Our key premise relies on experiments we conducted which indicate that 
judgments of the folk elicited under higher quality cognitive or epistemic conditions are 
more likely to resemble those of the philosopher. We end by showing how our 
experimental findings can help us better understand the Knobe Effect.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Experimental philosophers have recently uncovered an impressive body of evidence for 
the surprising conclusion that philosophers' intuitions about knowledge, morality, 
intentional action, reference and other foundational notions are out of step with those of 
the public. Since these intuitions play an important role in philosophical theorizing and 
are also assumed to be widely shared, experimental philosophers have taken these results 
to call into doubt the reliability of our intuitions and thereby challenge the very 
foundations of traditional philosophy. In this paper, we put forward an empirical method 
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for assessing the soundness of this criticism, and report on experiments we carried out 
that implement this method. As a case study, we look closely at one of the most famous 
experimental philosophy results, the Knobe Effect, and conclude that it gives us little 
reason to be pessimistic about the reliability of intuitions or about the prospects of 
traditional philosophy. Two further points fall out of our study. First, we can rule out 
Joshua Knobe's theoretical account of the effect. Second, we give some reasons to think 
that the effect is sensitive to factors concerning two distinct cognitive processes known in 
psychology as System 1 and System 2.  
2. Experiments and Traditional Philosophy 
 
 
It is difficult to imagine a serious account of some philosophical concept that is wholly 
indifferent to our intuitions. An ethical theory which predicts that murder is always a 
good thing is implausible from the get-go. It runs up against intuitions to the effect that 
murder in certain cases is bad. An epistemic theory which says ‘we know nothing’ is 
difficult to accept because it conflicts with intuitions to the effect that we know many 
ordinary propositions (e.g. ‘I exist’, ‘2+2=4’ etc.). These counter-examples are so 
compelling that they are nearly enough to discredit the theories in question.1 
This modest piece of reasoning displays philosophical methodology in action. 
Indeed, many philosophers believe that intuitions carry great evidentiary weight. Saul 
Kripke (1980, p. 42) suggests at least this much:    
…Of course some philosophers think that something's having intuitive 
content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it…I really don't know in 
                                                
1 Of course, the exact role of intuitions in traditional philosophy is a controversial issue. See, for example, 
Ernest Sosa (2005, 2007) and Timothy Williamson (2007). Although most of this section describes one 
plausible way of understanding their role, the main points of this paper can be established under much 
weaker assumptions (see the last paragraph of this section for more details). 
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a way what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything 
ultimately… 
One doesn't have to accept Kripke's (perhaps strong) remarks concerning evidence and 
intuition to recognize that appealing to intuitions is standard practice in philosophy. 
 A question that has not been seriously investigated until recently is whether or not 
the intuitions that philosophers call upon to develop their theories are shared by the 
general public.2 In the last few years, however, some theorists known as 'experimental 
philosophers' have attempted to answer this question. They have gathered a fascinating 
body of evidence which suggests that philosophers' intuitions concerning knowledge, 
intentional action, reference, morality and other central notions are distinct from the 
intuitions held by the general public, or in some cases certain socio-economic or cultural 
groups.3 
Some theorists take these results to show that contemporary philosophical practice 
must change. One line of criticism is that if philosophy aims to say something of 
relevance to humanity, and not just to philosophers, it must take into account the 
intuitions of the general public-- and this requires adopting whatever empirical methods 
are needed to carry out this project in a scientifically respectable manner.4 Another more 
                                                
2 This question is especially pertinent given that philosophers often carry out their investigations in the 
‘armchair’, or by consulting only their peers (and hardly ever by directly consulting the public).  
3 There is a large body of literature on each of these topics. Here is a very small sampling of it. Knowledge: 
Alexander and Weinberg (2007); Bengson et al,. (2008); Intentional Action: see the citations found in this 
paper; Reference: Machery et al., (2004); Mallon et al., forthcoming; Morality: Haidt (2001); Cushman, 
Hauser, and Young (2006). For differences that arise among different socio-economic or cultural groups, 
see Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (2003); Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001). 
4 On this way of thinking, intuitions should still be used in philosophical theorizing but we must ensure that 
they are genuine folk intuitions (gathered using empirical methods). Most notably, Knobe’s, (e.g. 2003a; 
2003b) aim is to give an account of intentional action, and he thinks that experimental philosophy can 
greatly aid this project. Bengson et al. (2008) think the evidence they gathered from the folk provides prima 
facie evidence for a radical intellectualist analysis of know-how. Knobe and Prinz  (2008) collected data 
they think is relevant for understanding the folk concept of consciousness. See Appiah (2008) and Nahmias 
(2006) for a general discussion along these lines.  
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radical line of criticism is that intuitions are unstable to the point of being unreliable and 
should, in many cases, no longer count as serious evidence in the development of 
philosophical theories (e.g. Weinberg, Stich, and Nichols, 2001).  Either way, it is 
thought that the results of experimental philosophy are of great significance to the future 
of philosophy.5 A key assumption driving both of these criticisms is a type of skepticism 
about philosophers' intuitions: the experimental results show that the evidentiary quality 
of philosophers' intuitions is lower than previously thought. 
We suspect, however, that many philosophers would not grant that this skepticism 
about intuitions is something that falls out of the results of experimental philosophy. 
They may hold that in the cases where the philosopher's intuition is incompatible with 
what the folk say in certain experimental conditions, the folk are probably mistaken. 
Consider a claim made by George Bealer (1999, p. 202): 
Many philosophers enjoy the pastime of ‘intuition bashing,’ and in support 
of it they are fond of invoking the empirical findings of cognitive 
psychologists. Although these studies evidently bear on ‘intuition’ in a 
less discriminating use of the term (e.g., as a term of uncritical belief), 
they tell us little about intuition in the relevant sense. 
Bealer distinguishes between ‘intuition’ as uncritical belief, and ‘intuition’ understood as 
a mental state one can have in ‘a higher quality cognitive condition'. The typical results 
of experimental philosophers would then mainly concern the former, whereas traditional 
philosophy is concerned with the latter. Timothy Williamson (2007, p. 7) makes a related 
point: 
                                                
5 These two criticisms correspond roughly to the two main camps experimental philosophers fall into when 
it comes to saying how their work is significant for philosophy. Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg 
(2006) call the first position the proper foundation view and the second position the restrictionist view. 
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 The method of conducting opinion polls among non-philosophers is not 
very much more likely to be the best way of answering philosophical 
questions than the method of conducting opinion polls among non-
physicists is to be the best way of answering physical questions… 
Although Williamson does not discuss intuitions here, the passage is suggestive of the 
following: the responses elicited from the folk in the conditions created by experimental 
philosophers (usually surveys) should carry minimal weight in philosophy. Furthermore, 
philosophers (in virtue of being experts) enjoy a relative epistemic advantage over non-
specialists. 
 These ideas then point to the notion that the reported conflicts between the 
philosopher and the public do not warrant skepticism about the intuitions employed by 
philosophers. This is because philosophers are in a better epistemic position than the folk 
when the latter are put in the typical experimental conditions. We call this general 
response to experimental philosophy 'The Immunity Objection'. The name suggests that 
traditional philosophers are largely immune from the sorts of criticisms raised by 
experimental philosophers.6 
 We believe that the Immunity Objection, suitably interpreted, has great merit. 
However, we do not believe that it is enough for philosophers to simply state the 
objection and go back to business as usual. One who accepts the objection must be 
                                                
6 The Immunity Objection can take various forms. Swain et al. (2008), for example, consider a version in 
which the philosopher's epistemic privilege comes from the fact that they are more reflective. In contrast, 
the experimental philosopher, by using surveys, is only calling for quick intuitions that are less reflective. 
Matthew Liao (2008) considers a similar objection he calls 'The Argument From Robust Intuitions'. Other 
authors that have criticized experimental philosophy on similar grounds include Antti Kauppinen (2007) 
and Ernest Sosa (2007). But these aren't the only ways to understand the Immunity Objection. For example, 
it might be thought that philosophers display higher levels of intelligence or that they are better at not being 
distracted by irrelevant details. The term 'Immunity Objection' is intended to cover this family of 
objections. 
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committed to a significant claim that is empirically testable: in the cases of conflict 
discussed by experimental philosophers, judgments of the folk delivered under sufficiently 
better epistemic conditions are more likely to match the intuitions of traditional 
philosophers. In this paper, we test the efficacy of the Immunity Objection against 
skeptical conclusions drawn from the Knobe Effect. The experiments we conducted give 
strong evidence for the soundness of the Immunity Objection applied in this domain. 
 A caveat is in order before we continue. We follow the literature in calling the 
following two types of judgments ‘intuitions’: judgments elicited from the folk in the 
typical experimental conditions and judgments philosophers make in response to thought 
experiments in the typical ‘armchair’ conditions. Thus, we will be using 'judgment' and 
'intuition' in these contexts interchangeably. This should not be understood as a 
commitment on our part to a substantive claim about the nature of intuitions (must they 
be quick and unreflective or must they be the product of careful deliberation?). However, 
it is worth pointing out that one of the take-home messages from this paper is that in the 
cases of interest where the folk and the philosophers disagree, they may be arriving at 
their judgments through distinct psychological processes.  
3. The Knobe Effect 
 
In a well-known experiment, Joshua Knobe (2003b) gave subjects the following vignette 
which we call 'Harm': 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase 
profits, but it will also harm the environment.’ The chairman of the board 
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answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want 
to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started 
the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. 
Knobe discovered that 82% of subjects given this vignette in a survey responded that the 
chairman intentionally harmed the environment. But now consider a parallel scenario, 
which we call 'Help', where the side effect on the environment is positive:  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase 
profits, and it will also help the environment.’ The chairman of the board 
answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I just want to 
make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started 
the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.  
When Knobe gave Help to a different set of subjects, he found that only 23% of them 
said that the chairman intentionally helped the environment. These results are robust. Our 
own experiments confirm this finding (see Appendix A). It has also been replicated for 
speakers of different languages (Knobe and Burra, 2006) and for young children (Leslie 
et al., 2006). We understand 'The Knobe Effect' to be the fact that agents placed in the 
experimental conditions typical of these studies give the asymmetric responses we have 
seen to the Harm and Help vignettes.7  The Knobe Effect suggests that competent 
judgments about whether someone intentionally brought about a side effect depend on the 
perceived moral quality of the action (including its side effects), and this is the 
                                                
7 This accords with Nichols and Ulatowski’s (2007) use of 'Knobe Effect'. 
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conclusion that Knobe himself wants to draw.8 
 These results are surprising.9 Many philosophers feel strongly that moral 
considerations do not bear on competent judgments of intentional action in the way that 
the Knobe Effect suggests.10 Here then is a case where experimental philosophers have 
found a conflict between philosophers' judgments and what the folk say under certain 
conditions. Accordingly, experimental philosophers will want to draw the skeptical 
conclusions. And this is where the Immunity Objection comes in: due to the 
philosopher’s epistemic privilege, her intuitions hold more evidentiary weight in getting 
at the concept of intentional action than those judgments elicited from the folk (in the 
typical experiments).  
 To test whether the Immunity Objection is effective in this case we conducted a 
number of experiments aimed to see whether the following hypothesis is true:  
General Hypothesis: Subjects in better epistemic conditions are less likely 
to display the Knobe Effect.  
If this hypothesis is correct, it is strong evidence that the Immunity Objection is a sound 
response to skeptical conclusions motivated by the Knobe Effect. To evaluate the General 
Hypothesis, we formed three more specific and testable hypotheses:  
Intelligence Hypothesis: Subjects with higher general intelligence are less 
                                                
8 We follow the literature in speaking of the environmental impact described in the vignettes as being ‘side 
effects’. But we are not convinced this is the best way of describing the situation if a side effect is supposed 
to not also be a means for bringing about the desired outcome. This is because it is possible to interpret the 
vignettes so that the environmental effect was a means for bringing about profits. For a discussion of this 
idea see Cushman et al. (2008).  
9 Although see Harman (1976) for a dissenting opinion. 
10 At least this much has been suggested by Knobe (2003b) and it is substantiated by the fact that 
philosophers find the Knobe Effect surprising. Note that we are only saying that the philosopher’s 
judgments about the Harm and Help scenario are symmetric. We do not make a commitment about the 
particular pattern of responses that generates the symmetry. Moreover, we don’t even assume that 
philosophers make uniform judgments about these cases, only that they are symmetric.  
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likely to display the Knobe Effect. 
Awareness Hypothesis: Subjects aware that their initial response to a 
question may be mistaken are less likely to display the Knobe Effect.  
Further Information Hypothesis: Subjects allowed to see both Help and 
Harm scenarios before giving answers are less likely to display the Knobe 
Effect. 
It is natural to think that the truth of these claims supports the general hypothesis. With 
respect to the Intelligence Hypothesis, it is plausible that having higher general 
intelligence gives one, ceteris paribus, an epistemic advantage over similarly situated 
individuals with lower general intelligence. With respect to the Awareness Hypothesis, it 
is often the case that one's knee-jerk reaction to a question is wrong, and being made 
aware of this puts one in a better epistemic situation. Simply put, one will reason more 
carefully. With respect to the Further Information Hypothesis, a person who is made 
aware of further relevant information concerning an issue is generally in a better 
epistemic position than someone equally positioned who does not possess that extra piece 
of information.  
 It turns out that our experiments support all the three hypotheses, and hence the 
General Hypothesis. The contrast between what the folk say in the typical experiments 
and what philosophers say is due to the relatively low quality of the experimental 
subjects' epistemic position. As a consequence, the Immunity Objection applied to the 
Knobe Effect is successful. In other words, the Knobe Effect does not give us good 
reason to be skeptical about intuitions and in particular, philosophers' intuitions.   
4. The Experiments 
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We conducted three experiments to test the General Hypothesis. But before we get to the 
experiments, we discuss what should count as a situation in which the Knobe Effect is 
reduced for people under better epistemic conditions. As mentioned earlier, the Knobe 
Effect is the great asymmetry found between the percentage of people who say 'Yes, the 
chairman intentionally harmed the environment' in response to the Harm vignette and the 
percentage of people who say 'Yes, the chairman intentionally helped the environment' in 
response to the Help vignette when these people are tested in the conditions created by 
the experimental philosopher. A high percentage of subjects give the first answer while a 
low percentage give the second answer. Suppose then that you divide a sample of the 
population into two groups such that one of them enjoys an epistemic advantage over the 
other. If you find that the subjects in the high epistemic quality group exhibit less 
asymmetry in their answers than those in the low epistemic quality group, then here is a 
case where the subjects in the better epistemic condition are less likely to exhibit the 
Knobe Effect. To be clear then, when we say in the context of this paper that subjects in a 
higher quality condition are less likely to exhibit the Knobe Effect, we should be 
understood as making a comparative claim: we are saying that they exhibit less 
asymmetry compared to subjects in relatively lower quality conditions. 
 To carry out these experiments, we surveyed 1,094 undergraduate students enrolled 
at Arizona State University between June and October of 2008. The surveys were 
conducted in classrooms. Every class that we surveyed, with the exception of one, was 
not an upper level philosophy class. In the case of the exception, the class is well-known 
to be populated mostly by people who have not taken other philosophy courses. The 
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surveys were administered by the authors of this paper.  
4.1 The Intelligence Hypothesis: Subjects With Higher General Intelligence are Less 
Likely to Display The Knobe Effect. 
In order to test the Intelligence Hypothesis, we needed a way of measuring general 
intelligence. We used Shane Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test. We predicted 
that groups that do better on this test were less likely to display the Knobe Effect. Two 
questions arise: what is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)? And why did we use it? 
Regarding the first, the CRT consists of three, quick questions: 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ cents 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it 
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes  
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days 
Consider (1). At first glance, the answer seems obvious. In fact, most participants have 
the immediate but mistaken impression that the solution is 10 cents, even when they go 
on and give the correct response. When participants reflect carefully (by double-checking 
their answer for example), they realize that their initial response is mistaken and settle on 
the correct answer (5 cents). Thus, 'catching [the] error is tantamount to solving the 
problem.' (Frederick, 2005, p. 27)  All three questions were specifically designed in this 
way: the seemingly obvious answer is wrong, but can be easily corrected upon minimal 
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reflection.11 
 So, why did we use this test? Frederick’s studies of over 3,000 participants revealed 
highly significant correlations between the CRT and many other measures of general 
intelligence (SAT verbal, SAT math, ACT, the Need for Cognition test, WPT, etc). 
Studies were conducted at multiple universities of differing SAT averages—the CRT 
averages tend to reflect these differences. Furthermore, the test is ideal for quick surveys 
since it can be taken in about two minutes. Ultimately, the CRT is suitable for our 
purposes since we only wish to separate participants into very broad groups of general 
intelligence (rather than more narrow groups, which would require something more like 
an IQ test).12  
4.1.1 Intelligence Experiment 
       Method 
The participants were 870 undergraduate students (873 originally, but 3 failed to 
complete both parts of the survey and so their partial answers were not included). They 
were split into four groups, each of which received a two-page survey. Participants were 
verbally instructed by those administering the surveys not to go back to the first sheet 
after they looked at the second sheet. At the bottom of the first page were instructions 
                                                
11 Explaining why he chose these questions, Frederick (2005, pp. 27-28) writes, 'The proposition that the 
three CRT problems generate an incorrect "intuitive" answer is supported by several facts. First, among all 
the possible wrong answers people could give, the posited intuitive answers (10, 100 and 24) dominate. 
Second, even among those responding correctly, the wrong answer was often considered first, as is 
apparent from introspection, verbal reports and scribbles in the margin (for example, 10 cents was often 
crossed out next to 5 cents, but never the other way around). Third, when asked to judge problem difficulty 
(by estimating the proportion of other respondents who would correctly solve them), respondents who 
missed the problems thought they were easier than the respondents who solved them…Fourth, respondents 
do much better on analogous problems that invite more computation. For example, respondents miss the 
"bat and ball" problem far more often than they miss the "banana and bagel" problem: "A banana and a 
bagel cost 37 cents. The banana costs 13 cents more than the bagel. How much does the bagel cost?’. 
12 Joshua Knobe suggested to us that the CRT may be understood as a measure of ‘reflectiveness’ and that 
this, in turn, may be seen as a feature of intelligence. We do not take a stance on this issue. It is enough for 
our purposes that the CRT correlates (in a highly significant way) with other measures of intelligence.  
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that they had to finish before they turned the page. And at the bottom of the second page 
were instructions to turn the test over once they completed it. The administrators 
monitored the students to ensure the instructions were followed. 
 Group 1 (N = 199) received the Harm vignette on the first page and then the CRT 
on the second page. Group 2 (N = 207) received the Help vignette and then the CRT. 
Group 3 (N = 234) received the CRT and then the Harm vignette, while Group 4 (N = 
230) received the CRT and then the Help vignette. We will refer to the first two groups as 
the 'CRT-After' ordering and the last two groups as the 'CRT-Before' ordering. The 
Harm/Help vignettes were immediately followed by this question: 
Which of the following do you agree with most? 
Those receiving the Harm vignette were given the following answer choices: 
(A) The chairman intentionally harmed the environment. 
(B) The chairman did not intentionally harm the environment. 
Those receiving the Help vignette received similar answer options except with ‘help’ 
replacing ‘harm’ in each.  
     General Intelligence Measure 
There were no statistically significant differences found in the CRT scores between the 
CRT-Before group (M = 0.77, SD = 1.00) and the CRT-After group (M = 0.85, SD = 
1.10), t(868) = -1.10, p = .272.  In each group, 45% of the participants answered at least 
one question correctly, χ2(1, N = 870) < .001, p > .999, Cramer's V = .002.  Thus, the 
evidence suggests that in the CRT-After ordering, the subjects' thinking about the 
Harm/Help vignettes did not affect the answers they gave on the CRT immediately after. 
It is fair to conclude then that the CRT-After ordering surveys accurately split 
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participants into groups of general intelligence. 
                             Results  
We used the CRT-After ordering to test the Intelligence Hypothesis.13 As predicted, 
general intelligence (as measured by the CRT) reduced the Knobe Effect. In particular, 
the Yes Harm judgment decreased in groups of greater general intelligence.14 In the Harm 
scenario, of the 107 participants who scored 0 on the CRT, 79% of them answered Yes 
Harm. But of the 92 participants who scored 1 or greater, only 65% gave that answer. A 
chi-square test showed this decrease to be significant, χ2(1, N = 199) = 4.367, p = .037. 
We point out, however, that no such increase or decrease was found for judgments in the 
Help scenario, χ2(1, N = 207) = .308, p = .579. See table 1 for a summary. Note that that 
we will often refer to a score of 1 or greater on the CRT as ‘1+’. 
Table 1 (CRT-After) 
 Yes Harm Yes Help 
CRT 0 79% 14% 
CRT 1+ 65% 18% 
                                 
      Discussion 
If we compare the group of those who scored 0 on the CRT and those who scored 1 or 
more, we found that the second group displayed less asymmetry. This supports the 
Intelligence Hypothesis: those who display higher general intelligence are less likely to 
exhibit the Knobe Effect. More details on this experiment can be found in Appendix B. 
                                                
13 We do not use the CRT-Before ordering to test the Intelligence hypothesis because getting questions 
right on the CRT affects how one responds to the Help/Harm vignettes. We will see below that this is the 
crucial result of the Awareness Experiment.  
14 We code the 'The chairman intentionally harmed the environment' answer as 'Yes Harm'. We also use 
'No Harm', 'Yes Help' and 'No Help' for the other answers. 
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4.2 The Awareness Hypothesis: Subjects Aware That Their Initial Response to a 
Question May Be Mistaken Are Less Likely to Display The Knobe Effect.  
Recall that each CRT question is designed in such a way that one’s first pass judgment is 
mistaken. Furthermore, most participants who get the correct answer have the initial 
mistaken intuitions of 10 cents, 100 minutes, or 24 days (see footnote 11). Suppose then 
that you have just taken the CRT and gotten some questions right. It is plausible that at 
this point, you are now made aware that your first pass judgment to problems may very 
well be mistaken. Accordingly, if you are then immediately given another question, this 
awareness may then play a role in how you answer that question. It is natural to think that 
this gives one an epistemic advantage. Being made so aware makes one, for the moment, 
into a more careful thinker. Hence, we predicted that those who get questions right on the 
CRT before they are given the Harm/Help vignette are less likely to display asymmetric 
answers than those who get questions right but take the CRT after they are given the 
Harm/Help vignette.15 
4.2.1 Awareness Experiment 
            Method 
Here, we look at the subjects who took the CRT before they were given the Harm/Help 
vignettes (Groups 3 and 4) and got at least one question right. The control are those who 
got at least one question right in the CRT-After condition (Groups 1 and 2). Since the 
control is composed of people with the same level of intelligence as measured by the 
CRT, we rule out level of intelligence as a confounding variable. We refer the reader to 
the 'Method' section of Experiment 1 for more details on the groups. 
            Results 
                                                
15 As far as we know, we are the first to use the CRT to prompt more careful reasoning. 
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We begin by looking at those who score a 1+ on the CRT in the CRT-After condition. 
65% of them answered Yes Harm to the Harm vignette. Now, for those who score a 1+ in 
the CRT-Before condition this percentage is 63%. There is no statistically significant 
difference between these figures, χ2(1, N=201)=.02, p=.893.  
 The interesting result comes when we look at the Yes Help numbers. In the CRT-
After condition, 18% of those who scored a 1+ on the CRT responded Yes Help to the 
Help vignette. But this percentage is much greater for those who scored a 1+ in the CRT-
Before condition. The percentage increases to 34% (See Table 2). This difference is 
statistically significant, χ2(1, N=192)=5.62, p=.018.16  
Table 2 (CRT-Before vs. CRT-After for CRT 1+) 
 Yes Harm Yes Help 
CRT-After   (1+ Score) 65% 18% 
CRT-Before (1+ Score) 63% 34% 
 
               Discussion 
Looking at table 2 we see that there is a reduction of asymmetry for the subjects who 
took the CRT before answering the vignettes and who got at least one question right. But 
before we conclude that this supports the Awareness Hypothesis, it is worth checking to 
see that this data is not better explained by another hypothesis. 
 It might be thought that the reduced asymmetry is due to the idea that performing 
well on the test does not increase 'awareness' but simply gets people to want to give the 
                                                
16 The comparison can also be made between the groups restricted to those who score a 2 or better on the 
CRT. Here are the results. In the CRT-After condition, 69% said Yes Harm while 15% said Yes Help. In 
the CRT-Before condition, however, 63% said Yes Harm while 45% said Yes Help. The difference 
between the Yes Harm responses is not statistically significant, χ2(1, N=115)=.1, p=.748. But the 
differences between the Yes Help answers is statistically significant, χ2(1, N=101)=9.5, p=.002. This adds 
further support for the Awareness Hypothesis.   
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opposite response from their initial 'gut reaction' answer. This idea fails since if this were 
the case, we would see that the increase in Yes Help answers is matched by an equal 
decrease in Yes Harm answers. But we saw that the Yes Harm answer does not 
significantly change between the groups being compared. 
 Now we saw that getting questions right on the CRT makes one aware that their 
initial 'gut feeling' responses to questions might be wrong. We conclude that this 
'awareness' is what explains the lowered asymmetry. Hence, the data presented here 
supports the Awareness Hypothesis. 17 18 
                                                
17 It is worth comparing the pattern of Help/Harm answers between groups separated by CRT scores in the 
CRT-Before ordering. 14% of those who scored a zero on the CRT said Yes Help while 34% of those who 
scored one or higher gave that answer. Hence, participants who answered at least one question correctly on 
the CRT-Before ordering were more likely to say Yes Help. This outcome is statistically significant χ2(1, N 
= 230) = 16.494, p < .001. Recall from the Intelligence Hypothesis discussion, however, that there was no 
statistically significant difference between the figures for the corresponding groups in the CRT-After 
ordering. This indicates that the difference in the CRT-Before condition is due to more than just an increase 
in intelligence--it is due to ‘awareness’. Furthermore, each point increase in the CRT (in the CRT-Before 
ordering for those scoring 1 or higher) corresponds to a remarkable increase in the percentage of Yes Help 
answers: 24% of those who scored a 1, 38% of those who scored a 2, and 56% of those who scored a 3 said 
Yes Help! These results provide strong evidence that even among participants scoring at least 1 on the CRT 
there is an association between CRT score and Help answer, χ2(2, N = 101) = 6.323), p = .042. This was 
also statistically significant. Note that since there is no such step-wise increase in Yes Help answers in the 
CRT-After ordering (see Appendix B) we believe that the increases are due to “awareness” and that this is 
evidence that “awareness” is gradable. 
18 A referee points out that some of the data collected from this experiment could also count against the 
Immunity Objection. In the CRT-Before condition, 89% of those who score a zero in the CRT answer ‘No 
Help’ while only 44% of those who got a perfect score in the CRT gave that answer. Assuming that 
philosophers tend to give the ‘No Help’ answer, it looks like the less smart and less aware folk give 
answers that are more closely aligned with what philosophers say than their smarter and more aware peers. 
The referee suggests that this result can count against the Immunity Objection. Here are some responses. 
First, it strikes us that discovering in our sea of data a pattern of answers that goes against the Immunity 
Objection is not enough to discredit it (we are not suggesting that the referee has this in mind, however). 
For we give in this paper plenty of other evidence in its favor. Moreover, this is evidence predicted by 
antecedently motivated hypotheses. Second, we must distinguish between a general form of the Immunity 
Objection and a more specific one applied to the Knobe Effect. In this paper, we are interested in testing the 
specific one, which predicts that subjects in better epistemic conditions are less likely to exhibit the Knobe 
Effect asymmetry. It is clear that the data the referee points to is not evidence against this hypothesis. But is 
it evidence against the more general one? The more general hypothesis is committed to the claim that the 
cases of conflict (found by experimental philosophers) between ordinary folk and philosophers are due to 
the epistemic advantage of the philosopher. The data, however, does not seem to constitute evidence 
against this, since presumably there is no conflict between the ordinary folk and the philosopher in their 
answers to the Help scenarios (they both say ‘No Help’). Moreover, the point of the Immunity Objection is 
to address data that have been used as evidence by theorists to draw certain well motivated conclusions of 
 18 
 To end this section, we would like to share a surprising discovery we stumbled 
upon when examining our numbers. If we look at the subjects that score perfectly on the 
CRT in the CRT-Before condition, we find an amazing pattern of answers. 65% of them 
say Yes Harm in response to the Harm scenario, while 56% say Yes Help in response to 
the Help scenario. This constitutes a dramatic reduction from the asymmetry found in the 
original Knobe studies. In fact, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
percentage of ‘Yes’ answers between subjects given the Help and Harm vignettes, χ2(1, N 
= 41) = .094, p = .759, Cramer's V = .098. For this group, the Knobe Effect has all but 
disappeared! What this result indicates is that those that are maximally ‘aware’ and 
maximally intelligent (as measured by the CRT) do not exhibit the Knobe Effect. We 
believe that this result taken on its own is very strong evidence for the soundness of the 
Immunity Objection applied to the Knobe Effect.19 
4.3 The Further Information Hypothesis: Subjects that are Allowed to See Both 
Help and Harm Scenarios before Giving Answers are Less Likely to Display The 
Knobe Effect. 
For this experiment, before we asked subjects to give their judgments on whether the 
chairman intentionally helped/harmed the environment, we gave them both the Harm and 
Help vignettes. By contrast, in Knobe's original studies, subjects were only given one 
story before being asked the corresponding question. The main difference then in our 
experiment is that we gave subjects more pertinent information before they had to make 
                                                                                                                                            
philosophical interests. The data discussed in this footnote is not of this type. Nonetheless, it might still be 
relevant to those wishing to give a positive accounts of the concept ‘intentionally’.  
19 At the time this manuscript was being prepared, we became aware of the interesting results in Cokely and 
Feltz (2009). They found no correlation between CRT and the ‘Knobe Effect’. There were some important 
differences between their probes and ours that we cannot fully discuss here. We point out, however, that 
their sample size was smaller (97 subjects) compared to ours (870 subjects for the CRT in the before and 
after conditions). Hence, we were able to detect subtle differences their probes could not. 
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up their minds. In general, giving subjects further relevant information will allow them to 
make a more informed judgment. In short, it will put them in a better epistemic position.  
We predicted that subjects who participate in this experiment were less likely to display 
the Knobe Effect.20  
 At this point we need to be more specific about what it means to have a reduction 
of the Knobe Effect in this condition. This requires a bit of set up so we ask the reader to 
bear with us. As mentioned before, in the original Knobe study 82% of subjects answer 
Yes Harm when presented the Harm vignette by itself. But 77% of subjects (from a 
different group) answer No Help when presented with the Help vignette by itself. But 
suppose we want to know the percentage of people who will have both of the following 
dispositions: The disposition to say Yes Harm in response to the Harm vignette given by 
itself, and the disposition to say No Help in response to the Help vignette given by itself. 
Simply put, we want to know what percentage of the population has the dispositions to 
make the Knobe asymmetric judgments. How can we determine the answer to this 
question? 
 It is difficult to carry out a direct experiment to determine this percentage. If we 
gave people both scenarios, one after the other, we run the risk that the reaction to the 
second scenario might be affected by their first answer. However, from the original 
Knobe numbers, we can determine the minimum percentage of people who have the 
dispositions to make the asymmetric judgments. Here's an informal explanation of how 
we computed this number. In what follows, we use the nearly identical figures we got 
                                                
20 Nichols and Ulatowski (2007) report on an experiment where subjects are also presented with both 
vignettes. One difference between their experiment and ours is that (in theirs) the subjects are asked for 
their reaction right after they read each vignette where there is no possibility that they can change their 
answer to the first vignette after reading the second. 
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when we replicated Knobe's numbers (because our sample size is larger, and is drawn 
from the same population as our experiments). These are 78% for Yes Harm (N=81) and 
18% for Yes Help (N=82). See Appendix A.   
 Suppose we are given a group of 100 randomly selected people. According to our 
results and idealizing, 78 of them are disposed to say Yes Harm when presented with the 
Harm vignette by itself. We know that at most 18 out of that 78 are also disposed to say 
Yes Help when presented with the Help vignette by itself (this is because 18 out of the 
total 100 are so disposed). This means that at least 60 (78 minus 18) out of that 78 are 
instead disposed to say No Help when presented with the Help vignette by itself. So, at 
least 60 have both dispositions. Converting to percentages, at least 60% of the population 
has both dispositions. That is, at least 60% of the population has the disposition to give 
the Knobe asymmetric answer. We leave the formal derivation of the result for Appendix 
C.21  
 We can now give a gloss to our prediction that the Knobe Effect will be reduced for 
a group in which both Help and Harm vignettes are given at the same time. This claim is 
made true if the percentage of people in that group who answer ‘Yes Harm and No Help’ 
is less than 60%. This counts as a reduction of the Knobe Effect. 
4.3.1 Further Information Experiment 
       Method 
The participants were 221 undergraduate students. Each received one sheet which 
contained both the Harm and the Help scenarios (ordering was counterbalanced) and a 
single question with four answer options: 
                                                
21 If we use Knobe's original data the minimum percentage population would be 59%. 
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(A) The first chairman intentionally harmed the environment and the second 
chairman intentionally helped the environment. 
(B) The first chairman did not intentionally harm the environment and the 
second chairman did not intentionally help the environment. 
(C) The first chairman intentionally harmed the environment, but the second 
chairman did not intentionally help the environment. 
(D) The second chairman intentionally helped the environment, but the first 
chairman did not intentionally harm the environment.  
The answer choices were suitably modified for the second ordering. The instructions also 
made it explicit that the companies in the two scenarios were unrelated.  
Results 
As predicted, adding more information reduces the Knobe Effect. Only 48% of 
participants chose the Knobe asymmetric response in this condition, compared to the (at 
least) 60% of people who are disposed to give these answers if they were given the 
scenarios on their own. (There was no ordering effect for the Knobe response--on both 
orderings it was 48%). Using the 60% number as the null hypothesis, the result is highly 
statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 221) = 17.422, p < .001.  
Discussion 
We just saw a reduction of the Knobe Effect among subjects who were allowed to see 
both scenarios before giving the judgments about the chairman. The number goes down 
from 60% to 48%. We emphasize that 60% is the most conservative number that is 
mathematically possible. In reality, the reduction may be much greater. We conclude then 
that there is good reason to think that the Further Information hypothesis is true. Being 
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presented with both scenarios does lead to a reduction of the Knobe Effect. 22  
4.4 General Discussion 
We saw that all the three hypotheses were empirically supported. The first experiment 
showed that subjects with higher general intelligence are less likely to exhibit the Knobe 
Effect. The second experiment showed that subjects that display ‘awareness’ are also less 
likely to display the effect. Finally, the Further Information experiment showed that when 
subjects are given both Help and Harm scenarios, they are less likely to give the 
asymmetric 'Knobe' response. Each of these results supports the General Hypothesis: that 
agents in better epistemic positions are less likely to exhibit the Knobe Effect. As 
previously discussed, a reduction of the effect reflects a pattern of answers that align 
more closely with philosophical judgment. We conclude that our data gives strong 
support for the Immunity Objection as applied to the sort of skepticism about 
philosophers' intuitions that may arise when presented with the Knobe Effect. Before we 
continue, however, we would like to address some worries about our results. 
Objection: The experiments all show that subjects in better epistemic conditions are less 
likely to display the Knobe Effect asymmetry. But it is not clear that this is enough to 
vindicate the Immunity Objection. If large majorities of subjects in the epistemically 
advantaged groups still display the asymmetry (although to a lesser degree than their 
                                                
22 There is another way one might interpret what it means to have a reduction of the Knobe Effect in this 
condition.  We could compare the percentage of Yes Harm answers when given both vignettes (which 
would be reflected by giving the (a) or the (c) answer in the multiple choice options above) to the 
percentage of Yes Harm answers when given only one vignette (and make a similar comparison with the 
'Help' answers).  On this way, as well as the one discussed in the main body of the paper, we found a 
significant reduction of the Knobe Effect.  57% of the 221 subjects given both vignettes said Yes Harm, 
this number is significantly different from the 78% Yes Harm out of the 81 subjects given only the Harm 
vignette, χ2(1, N = 302) = 10.470, p = .001.  There was no such association for the Yes Help answers, χ2(1, 
N = 303) = 1.125, p = .289. This way of understanding the reduction is, however, complicated by the fact 
that there is likely a slight ordering effect (depending on which vignette is given first) for the ‘non-Knobe’ 
answers (e.g. ‘Yes Harm and Yes Help’ etc.--see Appendix D). This ordering effect is interesting but we do 
not pursue it here. 
 23 
peers in the disadvantaged groups), then it looks like the difference in intuitions between 
the philosophers and the folk is not solely due to the former’s presumed epistemic 
advantage. The difference might be due to something else (for example, bias due to 
philosophical training). And if so, the Immunity Objection is not vindicated. 
 
Response: Before we get to the heart of the objection, we want to make some preliminary 
points. Since we discovered statistically significant reductions in asymmetry between the 
relevant groups of subjects, we have found evidence in favor of the Immunity Objection. 
We agree that (in certain cases) discoveries of larger reductions would constitute stronger 
evidence. But (of course) the fact that there might be better evidence available should not 
take away from the significance of our results. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect 
that subjects in the epistemically superior groups will give the same answers as 
philosophers. We should not suppose, for example, that those who score 1 or greater on 
the CRT in our experiments are on equal epistemic footing as the philosophers. So 
defenders of the Immunity Objection should not expect the asymmetries to completely 
vanish for our experimental groups (groups in the better epistemic conditions). 
 Now, let us address the heart of the objection. Given the reported reductions in 
asymmetry, we can still wonder about how much support we have actually found for the 
Immunity Objection (as applied to the Knobe Effect). We believe that the results reported 
in this paper provide strong support for it. Using the simple mathematical methods 
discussed in the third experiment and in Appendix C, we can see how in each of our three 
probes, the experimental groups exhibit reduced asymmetries to the point where we 
should doubt that anything like a large majority of their members exhibit the Knobe 
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Effect. Let us turn to this. In the Intelligence Experiment, out of those who scored a 1+ on 
the CRT in the CRT-After condition, 65% of them say Yes Harm and 18% say Yes Help. 
From this, the strongest thing we can conclude about the pervasiveness of the Knobe 
Effect is that at least 46% of them (65 minus 18) and at most 65% exhibit the Knobe 
Effect (have the disposition to say Yes Harm and the disposition to say No Help). 
Similarly, in the Awareness Experiment, out of those who score a 1+ in the CRT-Before 
condition, we can only conclude that at least 29% and at most 63% of them exhibit the 
Knobe Effect. Finally, in the Further Information Experiment, exactly 48% of those 
receiving the ‘further’ information exhibit the Knobe Effect. In sum, we see that in all our 
conditions, the epistemically privileged groups exhibit reduced asymmetries to the point 
where we cannot even establish that the majority of their members exhibit the Knobe 
Effect. In the case of the third experiment, and in the highest scoring group from the 
second experiment, we can say for sure that the majority do not exhibit the Knobe Effect. 
In light of this information, we doubt that anything like a large majority of subjects in our 
epistemically superior groups display the Knobe Effect. It is fair to conclude then that our 
results give strong evidence for the Immunity Objection as applied to the Knobe Effect. 
5. Implications for Understanding the Concept of Intentional Action. 
 
The asymmetry in the responses to the Help and Harm scenarios elicited in the original 
Knobe experiment suggested to some that the folk concept of intentional action is 
intimately connected to assessments (conscious or not) of the moral quality of the action 
including its side effects. After all, the only salient difference between the Harm and Help 
scenarios is whether the environmental effect is good or bad.  It might be thought that a 
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competent deployment of the concept of intentional action would have it that the 
chairman in the Harm scenario intentionally harmed the environment, while the chairman 
in the Help scenario did not intentionally help the environment. That is, the asymmetry 
discovered by Knobe does not reflect random performance factors and instead accurately 
reflects our competence with the concept 'Intentionally'. 23 If we add to this position the 
further idea that there is only one concept 'Intentionally', we have what we call the 'One 
Concept' theory. Nichols and Ulatowski (2007) and Machery (2003) attribute to Knobe a 
position approximating this view, and we have confirmed with Knobe (personal 
communication) that this is what he believes.24 
 The One Concept view requires that the responses to the Harm and Help scenarios 
which reflect competency with 'Intentionally' are Yes Harm and No Help respectively.25 
Our study gives evidence that the One Concept view is mistaken. If the asymmetric 
responses are those that reflect competency, then people in better epistemic conditions 
should not exhibit less asymmetry. The results presented in this paper, however, show the 
opposite result. People in better epistemic conditions do exhibit less asymmetry.  
6. System 1/System 2 Considerations. 
 
Dual-process theory, a widely accepted view in cognitive psychology, maintains a 
                                                
23 See Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 for a discussion of the evidence that the Knobe Effect is not due to 
performance errors. 
24 We take the one concept view to be incompatible with the idea that the ‘intentionally’ concept is context 
sensitive (i.e. the extension of the concept varies with the context of thought). Similarly, we take it to be 
incompatible with the idea that the concept is relativistic in the sense that its extension varies with some 
‘interesting’ parameter (neither the time nor the world parameters) in the circumstance of evaluation. 
Nichols and Ulatowski (2007) and Cushman and Mele (2008) explicitly reject the one concept view. 
25 This assumes that the vignettes are not so severely underdetermined so that any of the available 
responses are potentially correct (because the stories could be completed in various ways). We suspect that 
Knobe would not accept that there is underdetermination since it would seriously undermine the 
conclusions he draws from his experiments: the asymmetry in responses would say more about how people 
are likely to fill in the story, than about their concept of intentional action. 
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distinction between two types of cognitive processing known as System 1 and System 
2.26 27 Daniel Kahneman (2003, p. 698) highlights some of the differences: 
The operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, effortless, 
associative, implicit (not available to introspection), and often emotionally 
charged; they are also governed by habit and are therefore difficult to 
control or modify. The operations of System 2 are slower, serial, effortful, 
more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled; they 
are also relatively flexible and potentially rule governed. 
Distinguishing these two types of processes has been very useful in understanding 
various cognitive processes including those connected to judgment, decision-making, and 
reasoning.28 We believe that the experiments presented in this paper are best explained by 
appealing to dual-process theory. Due to space limitations, the following remarks are 
speculative. We take ourselves to be merely suggesting that research along these lines 
may prove fruitful. 
  The first experiment showed that responses on the Harm vignette are correlated 
with general intelligence. How might this finding connect with dual-process theory? 
Evans (2008, p.262) states that, 'One of the stronger bases for dual-systems theory is the 
                                                
26 See Evans, (2003, 2008) for excellent overviews of dual-process theories. Also, it's worth mentioning 
that these theories, although popular, are not uncontroversial. See Gigerenzer and Regier (1996), Osman 
(2004), and Keren and Schul (forthcoming) for criticisms. 
27 It is important to note that the distinction we are appealing to is simply between two kinds of processes, 
which is a much weaker claim than there being two systems in a more robust sense of the term. Kahneman 
and Frederick write, ‘[The terms System 1 and System 2] may suggest the image of autonomous 
homunculi, but such a meaning is not intended. We use systems as a label for collections of processes that 
are distinguished by their speed, controllability, and the contents on which they operate’ (2002, p.51). 
28 For a sampling of the literature, see Epstein (1994); Sloman (1999); Stanovich and West (1998); 
Liebermann, (2000, 2007); Nisbett et al. (2001); Kahneman and Frederick, (2002, 2005); Evans (2003, 
2006, 2008). Also note that these theorists do not all use the terms System 1/System 2. For instance, 
Epstein (1994) uses the names experiential and rational systems, and Sloman (1996) uses associative and 
rule-based systems. 
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evidence that “controlled” cognitive processing correlates with individual differences in 
general intelligence and working memory capacity, whereas “automatic” processing does 
not'. Evans here ties higher general intelligence with use of ‘controlled’ systems, which in 
turn are normally associated with System 2 processes. If this is right, then there is good 
reason to think that participants of greater general intelligence are less likely to say Yes 
Harm because they are relying more on System 2 processes. Hence, the reduction of the 
asymmetry from the first experiment may be due, in part, to System 2 considerations. 
 In the second experiment, we found that increased 'awareness' resulted in a greater 
number of participants saying Yes Help. One plausible line of thinking is that getting at 
least one correct answer on the CRT is what psychologists call disfluent. That is, doing 
well on the CRT causes a 'metacognitive' feeling that one's cognitive processes are not 
operating smoothly. This is because getting a question right on the CRT amounts to 
realizing that one's initial answer was mistaken. This disfluency then results in the 
activation of System 2 processing. Recent work suggests that there is precedence for this 
idea. Alter et al. (2007), for example, give evidence that disfluency tends to cause greater 
System 2 activation. Thus, dual-process theory looks like a promising way to help 
explain the results of the second experiment. 
 Concerning the third experiment, we believe that presenting agents with both 
vignettes (and letting them see the range of multiple choice answers), pushes them to 
think more carefully before giving the final judgment. If we compare this with the 
original Knobe experiments (where subjects were given only one vignette followed by 
just two answer options), it is plausible that subjects there were less careful in their 
reasoning. Since, as we mentioned earlier, thinking more carefully is characteristic of 
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System 2 processes, the reduction of the asymmetry may be due to increased activation of 
that system.29  
 We conclude then that one's reaction to the Help or Harm vignettes should be 
understood in terms of dual-process theory. If this line of reasoning is correct, then 
insofar as research into the Knobe Effect is not sensitive to System 1/System 2 
considerations, one should be hesitant before drawing conclusions about the concept of 
intentional action or general skepticism about philosophical practice.30 
7. Conclusion 
 
We began with a discussion of the experimental philosopher's challenge to traditional 
philosophy. In particular, we considered the idea that the experimental results give us 
reason to be skeptical about the intuitions that philosophers use in theorizing, and as a 
consequence traditional philosophy should change its methods. We then considered the 
Immunity Objection: this skepticism is not warranted because the judgments of 
philosophers are made in better epistemic conditions than those elicited from the folk in 
the typical experiments. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, we presented empirical evidence 
                                                
29 One possible line of research worth noting is the similarity between our third experiment and what’s 
known as 'framing effects' in the psychological literature. See Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for an early 
discussion of the most famous framing effect, the Asian Disease example.  
30 We warn against a simplistic understanding of our experiments and their connection to System 2. We do 
not want to say that if a group that is in a higher quality epistemic condition (and hence displays an increase 
in System 2 activation) is more prone to give a certain answer to a vignette, then that answer is the correct 
or the competent response to the vignette. This conclusion assumes that (a) there is but one concept 
‘Intentionally’ and (b) that the vignettes are not radically undetermined so that they admit of many 
plausible interpretations (which may yield different competent/correct answers). In fact, at least one author 
of this paper believes that both of these assumptions are very likely false and that System 2 activation has 
the effect of making people ‘aware’ (in some sense) that one or both of these assumptions are in fact false. 
We can imagine keen subjects having the following reaction to the vignettes 'well, the answer depends on 
what you mean by "intentionally" and it also depends on whether the "side effect" is a means for bringing 
about profit'. For these and other reasons, we do not give a positive account of the Knobe Effect in this 
paper. The results of this paper have led us to believe that a full account of the Effect is much more 
complicated than previously thought.  
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that the Immunity Objection is effective. We also concluded that a certain explanation of 
the Knobe Effect attributed to Joshua Knobe is likely mistaken, and that reactions to the 
Harm and Help vignette may be subject to System 1/System 2 considerations. On a 
broader note, we hope to have shown how, through the use of the sorts of empirical 
methods displayed in this paper, we may better understand the connection between 
experimental and traditional philosophy.  
                
 
 
Appendix A. Replication of the Knobe Effect 
Help Vignette (N=82) 
Yes: 15  
 Yes: 18.29% 
 
 Harm Vignette (N=81) 
 Yes: 63 
 Yes: 77.77% 
 
 
 
Appendix B. CRT-Before and CRT-After Results 
CRT Followed by Harm Vignette 
Total (N=234) YES (N=163) NO (N=71) 
CRT 0 (N=125) 94 (75%) 31 
CRT 1 (N=48) 30 (63%) 18 
CRT 2 (N=38) 24 (63%) 14 
CRT 3 (N=23) 15 (65%) 8 
CRT 1+(N=109) 69 (63%) 40 
CRT 2+(N=61) 39 (64%) 22 
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CRT Followed by Help Vignette 
Total (N=230) YES (N=48) NO (N=182) 
CRT 0 (N=129) 14 (11%) 115 
CRT 1 (N=54) 13 (24%) 41 
CRT 2 (N=29) 11 (38%) 18 
CRT 3 (N=18) 10 (56%) 8 
CRT 1+ (N=101) 34 (34%) 67 
CRT 2+ (N=47) 21 (45%) 26 
 
 
Harm Vignette Followed by CRT 
Total (N=199) YES (N=145) NO (N=54) 
CRT 0 (N=107) 85 (79%) 22 
CRT 1 (N=38) 23 (61%) 15 
CRT 2 (N=31) 22 (71%) 9 
CRT 3 (N=23) 15 (65%) 8 
CRT 1+(N=92) 60 (65%) 32 
CRT 2+(N=54) 37 (69%) 17 
 
Help Vignette Followed by CRT 
Total (N=207) YES (N=32) NO (N=175) 
CRT 0 (N=116) 16 (14%) 100 
CRT 1 (N=37) 8   (22%) 29 
CRT 2 (N=22) 2   (9%) 20 
CRT 3 (N=23) 6   (19%) 26 
CRT 1+ (N=91) 16 (18%) 75 
CRT 2+ (N=54) 8   (15%) 46 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. 60% "Minimum" Computation  
 
Let 'Joe Sixpack' be the name of a randomly selected person. Let P be the proposition that 
Joe Sixpack has the disposition to answer YES HARM when being presented with the 
Harm vignette on its own. Let Q be the proposition that Joe Sixpack has the disposition to 
answer YES HELP when presented with the Help vignette on its own. We assume that ~P 
is the proposition that Joe Sixpack has the disposition to answers NO HARM in the 
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relevant conditions, and that ~Q is the proposition that Joe Sixpack has the disposition to 
answer NO HELP in the relevant conditions. 
 We show that the probability of (P and ~Q) is at least 60%. We can understand 
this number as the probability that a person exhibits the full Knobe Effect under the 
experimental conditions of the original Knobe experiment.     
Proof:  
1. "Additivity" Axiom: Pr(XvY) = Pr(X) + Pr(Y) when X and Y are logically 
incompatible.  
2.Replacing (P and Q) for X and (P and ~Q) for Y, we get: 
*Pr[(P and Q) v (P and ~Q)]= Pr(P and Q) + Pr(P and ~Q). 
3. Since P is equivalent to [(P and Q) v (P and ~Q)], we can substitute in * to get: 
 **Pr(P)=Pr(P and Q) + Pr(P and ~Q) 
4. We established from our replication of the Knobe Result that Pr(P) is .78. Furthermore, 
Pr(Q) is .18.  So Pr(P and Q) is at most .18.  
5. From 4 and ** we deduce that Pr(P and ~Q) is at least .60 Hence the likelihood that a 
person exhibits the Knobe effect (in the intended sense) is at a minimum 60%. 
 
Appendix D. "Further Information" Experiment Data 
 
     "Further Information" Survey Results (by ordering) 
 Harm First Order (N=110) Help First Order (N=111) 
Yes Harm, Yes Help 4 15 
No Harm, No Help 48 39 
Yes Harm, No Help (Knobe) 53 53 
No Harm, Yes Help 5 4 
 32 
 
References 
Alexander, J., and Weinberg, J. 2007: Analytic epistemology and experimental 
philosophy. Philosophy Compass, 2, 56-80. 
 
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D.M., Epley, N., and Eyre, R.N. 2007: Overcoming intuition: 
metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 136, 569–576. 
 
Appiah, K.A. 2008: Experiments in Ethics. The Mary Flexner Lectures Series of Bryn 
Mawr College. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bealer, G. 1999: Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In M. DePaul and W. 
Ramsey (eds) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role In 
Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
Inc. 
 
Bengson, J., Moffett, M. and Wright, J. 2007: Know-how and concept possession. 
Philosophical Studies, 136, 31-57. 
 
Cokely, E.T. and Feltz, A. 2009. Individual differences, judgment biases, and  
Theory-of-Mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry. 
Journal of Research in Personality. Volume 43, Issue 1, 18-24.  
 
Cushman, F., Young, L., and Hauser, M. 2006: The role of conscious reasoning and 
intuition in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm. Psychological 
Science, 17, 1082-1089. 
 
Cushman, F. and Mele, A. 2008: Intentional action: two and half folk concepts. In J. 
Knobe and S. Nichols (eds) Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Epstein, S. 1994: Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American 
Psychologist, 49, 709-724. 
 
Evans, J. 2003: In two minds: dual process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7, 454–459. 
 
Evans, J. 2006: The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: extension and    
            evaluation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13, 378–395. 
 
Evans, J. 2008: Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition". 
Annual Review of Psychology, 59: 255-278. 
 
 33 
Frederick, S. 2005: Cognitive reflection and decision making. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19, 25-42. 
 
Gigerenzer, G. and Regier, T. 1996: How do we tell an association from a rule? 
Comment on Sloman (1996). Psychological Bulletin, 119, 23-26 
 
Haidt, J. 2001: The emotional dog and its rational tail. Psychological Review, 108, 814-
834. 
 
Harman, G. 1976: Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics, 29, 431-63. 
 
Kahneman D, and Frederick, S. 2002: Representativeness revisited: attribute  
substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman 
(eds) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kahneman, D. 2003: A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded 
rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697-720 
 
Kahneman D, and Frederick, S. 2005: A model of heuristic judgment. In K. Holyoak and 
R.G. Morrison (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kauppinen, A. 2007: The rise and fall of experimental philosophy. Philosophical 
Explorations, 10, 95-118. 
 
Keren, G., and Schul, Y. (Forthcoming): Two is not always better than one: A critical      
            evaluation of two system theories. Perspectives on Psychological Science. 
 
Knobe, J. 2003a: Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63, 
190-193. 
 
Knobe, J. 2003b: Intentional action in folk psychology: an experimental investigation. 
Philosophical Psychology, 16, 309-324. 
 
Knobe, J. 2006: The concept of intentional action: a case study in the uses of folk 
psychology.  Philosophical Studies, 130, 203-231. 
 
Knobe, J. and Burra, A. 2006: Intention and intentional action: a cross-cultural study. 
Journal of Culture and Cognition, 6, 113-132. 
 
Kripke, S., 1980: Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. 
 
Leslie, A., Knobe, J. and Cohen, A. 2006: Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 
‘theory of mind’ and moral judgment. Psychological Science, 17, 421-427. 
 
 34 
Liao, M. 2008: A defense of intuitions. Philosophical Studies, 140, 247-262. 
 
Lieberman, M.D. 2000: Intuition: a social cognitive neuroscience approach. 
Psychological Bulletin, 126, 109-137. 
 
Lieberman, M.D. 2007: The X- and C-systems: the neural basis of automatic and 
controlled social cognition. In E. Harmon-Jones and P. Winkelman (eds) 
Fundamentals of Social Neuroscience. New York: Guilford. 
 
Livengood, J. and Machery, E. 2007: The folk probably don’t think what you think they 
think: experiments about causation by absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 
21, 107-127. 
 
Machery, E. 2008: The folk concept of intentional action: philosophical and experimental 
issues. Mind & Language, 23, 165-189. 
 
Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2004: Semantics, cross-cultural style. 
Cognition 92, B1-B12. 
 
Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2009: Against arguments from 
reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:2, 332-356.  
 
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., and Turner, J. 2006: Is incompatibilism  
 intuitive?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 28-53 
 
Nichols, S., Stich, S., Weinberg, J. 2003: Meta-skepticism: meditations in ethno-
epistemology. In S. Luper (ed) The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate. 
 
Nichols, S., and Ulatowski, J. 2007: Intuitions and individual differences: the Knobe 
Effect revisited. Mind and Language, 22, 346-365. 
 
Nisbett R., Peng, K., Choi, I., Norenzayan, A. 2001: Culture and systems of thought:  
holistic vs. analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291–310. 
 
Osman, M. 2004: An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic 
            Bulletin & Review, 11, 988-1010. 
 
Sloman S.A. 1996: The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119, 3–22. 
 
Sosa, E. 2005: A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy. In M. Bishop and D.  
Murphy (eds.) Stich and his Critics. Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Sosa, E. 2007: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical  
Studies, 132(1), 99-107. 
 35 
 
Stanovich, K., and West, R. 1998: Individual differences in rational thought. Journal  
of Experimental Psychology, 127, 161-188. 
 
Swain, S., Alexander, J., and Weinberg J. (2008): The instability of philosophical  
intuitions: running hot and cold on truetemp”.  Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 76, 138 – 155. 
 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1974: Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics  
and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
 
Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2001: Normativity and epistemic intuitions.  
Philosophical Topics, 29, 429–460. 
 
Weinberg, J., Alexander, J., and Gonnerman, C. manuscript: Unstable  
intuitions and need for cognition: how being thoughtful sometimes just means 
being wrong in a different way.  
 
Williamson, T. 2007: The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Publishing. 
 
 
